State of Utah v. James D. Chambers, Stanley Ned Jacobsen and J.D. (Last Name Unknown) : Brief of Appellants by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1984
State of Utah v. James D. Chambers, Stanley Ned
Jacobsen and J.D. (Last Name Unknown) : Brief of
Appellants
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Kenneth R. Brown and J. Bruce Savage; Attorneys for
Appellants
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Chambers, No. 19152 (1984).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4065
IN TI-IE SUPREME COURT OF TI-IE STATE OF lITAH 
<CTATE OF lITAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
JAMES D. CHAMBERS, STANLEY NED 
JACOBSEN, and J.D. (last name 
unknown), 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No 19151 
Case No. 19152 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction of Burglary, a second 
degree felony and Theft, a second degree felony, in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Sunmit County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
'::~It Lake City, Utah 84114 
/\t l_orrv'y for Respondent 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
Attorney for Appellant Chambers 
10 West 300 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 363-3550 
J. BRUCE SAVAGF. 
Attorney for Appellant Jacobsen 
P.O. Box 2520 
Park City, Utah 84060 
(801) 649-5039 
Irl THE SUPREJ,1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
'.'d !dT OF lJT AH , 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
JAMES D. CHAMBERS, STANLEY NED 
JACOBS!:JJ, and J .D. (last name 
unknown), 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 19151 
Case No. 19152 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal from a Judgment and conviction of Burglary, a second 
dE"gnc.e felony and Theft, a second degree felony, in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Surnnit County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
1. Denrn s Frederick, Judge, presiding. 
[,L'.'JL, L. v:ILK][JS'111 
., ' 1 r rl''\' (£nt~r rl1 
it'"' r\1r·1 t (_•! 
.t J.,1y.r-, 1'1tv, LIL.tll H .• !Jt. 
KENNETH R. BRO\'JN 
AttorT1ey for Appellant Chambers 
10 West 300 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
( 801) 363-3550 
J. BRUCE SAVAGE, 
AttorT!ey for Appellant Jacobsen 
P.O. Box 2520 
Park City, Utah 84060 
(801) 649-5039 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
. I ! . !1l1U Jl OF THE NA TlJRE OF THE CASE . 
[·l'~f'CJSITlOfJ IN THE LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOlJG!-IT ON APPEAL. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS . 
ARGUMEIJl 
POHJl 
POHIT II 
PCJirJl III 
POI! Jl IV 
['(l]!f! v 
'"il'!l1qr111 ... 
1':tt'•,l 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT SUPPRESSING 
EVIDNCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT 
BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH 
WARRANT WAS INSUFFICIENT AND SEIZURE OF THE 
EVIDENCE CONSTITlITED A VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' 
co;::. 1 T\ITIONAL RIGHTS ........•... 
APPE IJ ·s WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY 
THE CG,' FAILURE TO REQUIRE THE STATE TO DIS-
CLOSE THE ~DENTITY OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT 
THE COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT AN 
UNSATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF POSSESSION COUPLED 
WITH OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES MAY BE SUFFICIENT TO 
COfJI'1ECT THE POSSESSORS WITH THE OFFENSE OF THEFT 
AND BURGLARY AND JUSTIFY THEIR CONVICTION OF 
THESE OFFENSES . . . . . . . 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION THAT POSSESSION OF PRO-
PERTY RECElffLY STOLEN, WHEN NO SATISFACTORY EX-
PLANATIOrJ OF SUCH POSSESSION IS MADE, SHALL BE 
DEEl-1ED PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE THAT THE PERSON IN 
POSSESSION STOLE THE PROPERTY IMPROPERLY SHIFTED 
THE BURDE!< OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANTS AND WAS 
INCONSISTE!ff WITH DEFENDA!ffS' RIGHTS TO BE PRE-
sur.1ED INNOCE!ff . . . . 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIEJff EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY 
COfNICTIOfJ In THIS CASE. 
TAflll OF r·A.'i! c; A!lD AlffHORITIES 
Page 
1 
2 
3 
5 
7 
8 
9 
10 
'''_'_'!i<_~·.: __ IL.Y~· 3''k U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509 (1964) ........ 3, 4 
ILLINOIS v. GATES, U.S. . 10 7• s.ct. 2:\1 7 11'lw11 ... 
SANDSTRCT"1 v. MJfITANA, 44:'. U.S. 57Cl, '14 S.Ct. 2'>40, 61 L.Ed.2d <;•1 
( 1 979) . . . . . . . . . 8' 'l 
SPINELLI v. UNITED STATES, 3'13 U.S. 4 lCl, 89 S. Ct. 584 ( 1 %'-1 I 4 
UNITED STATES v. FORSHEE, 611 P.2d 1222 (1981 I s,r, 
UNITED STATES v. WALTON, 646 P.2d 689 (1982) . 8,'J 
UNITED STATES v. WISWELL, 629 P.2d 146 (1981) 7 
Statutes Cited 
Utah Code Ann., Section 76-6-202(1) (1953), as amended 
Utah Code Ann. , Section 76-6-402 (1953), as amended 7 
Utah Code Ann., Section 76-6-404 ( 1953), as amended 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 36. 5 
lIJ TI-lE SlJPREJ•1F COURT OF TI-lE STATE OF lJfAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
JAHES D. CHAf·1BERS, STANLEY NED 
JACOBSEfJ, and J.D. (last name 
llllknO';;n) ' 
Case No. 19151 
Case No. 19152 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATENE: IT OF TI-lE NA TlJRE OF TI-lE CASE 
Appellants were charged with burglary, in violation of Title 
"•, Charter 6, Section 202 ( 1 ) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
,·1 SF'"~nd-degree felony, and theft, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 
; , S1cct 1 on 404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a second-degree 
f • } C1I !'j. 
DISPOSITION IN TI-lE L,Ot,JER COURT 
Appellants v1ere tried before a JW)! and found guilty of both 
1 ·iHr•1•~s. in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable J. Dennis 
I· r' <J, r 1 ck presidin0. Ser 1tence of an indetemunate tenn of frcm one 
f1f\,.,·1: y1~,,rc, \·1,:is 1mpt--ed ""both Appc·llants on March 21, 1983 and 
hj>p• If ,-mt'"' s•·ek a11 r:>rd•T of this Court reversing the judgrrent 
STAID·1ElIT OF nlE FACTS 
Richard Tharpson a resident of Park City, Utah and the victim 
of this crirre arrived back fran a business trip on January ~ 1983 to 
find that his house had been burglarized and various items of personal 
property were discovered rmssing ( T. 13) . Of those i terns discovered 
missing there was a certain VCR uru t, various guns, and a pair of cow-
boy boots (T. 14-47). 
On January 6, 1983 a person called the Park City Police De-
partment, indicating that he had certain infonnation regarding a burglary 
and theft occurring in Park City, Utah. Later that same day officers 
fran the Park City Police Department met with that person (hereinafter 
referred to as confidential inf onnant and ref erred to such throughout 
the proceedings) (T. 58). The confidential infonnant arranged a meeting 
bebaeen Appellants and a Park City police officer operating undercover, 
for January 7, 1983 (T. 65). All of the details of that particular meet-
ing were arranged by the confidential infonnant (T. 82). 
On January 10, 1983 Joseph L. Offert, a Park City police officer 
sought and obtained a Search Warrant for Appellant Chamber's residence. 
In connection with obtairnng the Search \!!arrant officer Off ert signed an 
Affidavit for a Search \•Jar rant. 
Pursuant to the Search \!!arrant officers executed on the Search 
\!Jarrant at the house of Appellant Chambers and seized as ev1dcnnc om· 
pair of Tony Lama size 8~D lizard tip cov.~y boots and one lu•]ar . .':' 
caliber pistol, serial nlll1tt:Rr 3CJ4'1G lbrov.n lb]tl1er hcdstc·r I lrctc1rr, •·f 
Search Warrant ) . 
Evidence wrnch the District Court denied and those two pieces of evidence 
,,.,~ introduced at the Appellant's trial (State's Exhibit 11 and State's 
Prior to trial Appellants filed a M::>tion to require the State 
1D disrlose the identity of a confidential informant which M::>tion was 
demed, 
Prior tor trial Appellant Chambers filed a Notice of Alibi and 
alibi evidence was presented at trial (T. 150-155 and 175-179). 
At the conclusion of the trial the State requested and the 
Court gave an Instruction regarding the presumption flowing from posses-
sion of recently stolen property without a satisfactory explanation and 
appli eel that both to the theft charge and the burglary charge (Instruction 
llo. 25). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT SUPPRESSING 
EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WAR-
RAIIT BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INSUFFICIENT AND 
SEIZURE OF THE EVIDENCE CONSTITUTED A VIO-
LATION OF APP2LLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Appellants concede that if the Court applies the test established 
•1, Illimos v. Gates, u. s. , 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983) in which the 
l\_•urt established the "totality of the circumstances" test then the Affi-
dd'JC t in Sup!->Ort of the Search Warrant was sufficient. 
HO\,ever AppPllan+s' p__isit1on is that the appropriate test to 
- --:-_._~, \-~- u,". 11 •H, cv. ::; . Ct. 1 ',(J'J l l 'lb4) wherein the United States 
",,.,,, C•Jurt •·stalrl1•J1F'Ci c-ihat has been called and referred to as the 
- 3-
"two-prong" test. The test was further m:xlified and affi m!Pd by the 
Suprane Court in Spinelli v. Uruted States, 393 U.S. 410, Bq S.Ct. SR4 
( 1969). The "two-prong" test requires that the infonnant 's information 
rru.st: 
(a) reveal the informant's basis of knowledge and 
(b) provide sufficient facts to establish either the in-
formant's veracity or the reliability of the informant's repcrt. 
The Affidavit in Suppcrt of the Search Warrant indicates the 
basis for the informant's knowledge as that of personal observation and 
conversation with Appellants. However the second prong of the Aguilar 
test is not established upon the four corners of the Affidavit in that there 
is nothing contained therein to establish either the informant's veracity 
or the reliability of the informant's repcrt. Appellants do note however 
that the independent police activity suppcrting the reliability of the 
information given by the confidential informant was the purchase of the 
vid~o recorder by an undercover officer and an identification of that 
video recorder by the victim. Appellant's contend that this is not suf-
ficient corrobcration under the Aguilar test to sustain the search. 
Appellants contend that the Aguilar-Spinelli "two-prong" test 
should be applied in this case, because the Illinois v. Gates, supr·a 
"totality of the cirCUIT'stances" test 111as prospective only. Appellants' 
pcsition is primarily taken from the Gates decision wht>rein at 10) 
S.Ct. 2332 the Supreme Court said: 
For~ all of these reH.s,-=ir i~ v1c cone l ud1 · t hc-Jt 
1 t is wiser to abaridon ttie "t_~,Ju-prc>rF(' 
test establ 1 shc>fi by ~r dec1s1 on.s i r 1 A{JU1 J ,1r~ 
and Sp111e11J. In 1t-::, p1rwt V-Jf' n~ciff1~ 
"totalitYOf tht c1rr·urL"t u1cec," rlndvsic. 
thar irarl.1t1onil1y f-ic-1°~ fr_1nT''.i 11r11tr1!·lt cau:-,,_~ 
-1.-
determinations. (efll)hasis added) 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS OF 
UWI BY THE COURT'S FAILURE TO REQUIRE 
THE STATE TO DISCLOSE THE IDENTITY OF 
THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Forshee, 611 P.2d 1222 in-
volving a charge of distribution of a controlled substance for value 
held that since the infonnant was m:::>re then a mere informer of a crime 
about to occur and actually took an active part in arranging meetings 
ard v11 tness the illegal drug sale the defendant's request for disclosure 
of the infonnant's identity was warranted. The Court went on to hold 
theit since the defendant knew the identity of the infonnant that the 
second exception to the privilege of non-disclosure had been met by the 
In the case at bar Appellants filed a Motion to require the 
State to prcx:luce the identity of the confidential infonnant, Appellant 
01amber filed a Notice of Alibi and the Affidavit in Support cf the Search 
'•iinTant contained inforrration regarding the knowledge of the confidential 
1r,:urmant and his participation in the crime. 
Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, (applicable at the time 
nf the' trial) provides: 
A witness has a privilege to refuse to 
d1c,close the ldentity of a person who has 
furnished lnformation purporting to dis-
close~] a v1olat1on of a provision of the 
lcfr.'S Df this SL-ite or of the United States 
t,, ,, t q ir •·~1 'lit <Jt l Vt' C>f the State of the 
1Jr111 f><l :<t (-1t 1, or ~Jc1'.'Cn1fT~-ntal d1vis1on 
1J.~tt'(·f, d1'1r·-J'·ri h'1tt1 the chJty of enforcing 
t11 11 prn\'l'.->ton, and eV1dence thereof is in-
oiCbJ',c,it,Jc, unl<ess the Judge finds that 
(,J) the ld•'nt1ty of the person furnishing 
-5-
the information has already been other--
wise disclosed or (b) disclosure of his 
identity is essential tc assure a fair 
determination of the issues. 
The Supreme Court in Forshee, supra indicated at pagP 1223: 
Whether the Court should require dis-
closure of an informer's identity, not 
otherwise known tc the defendant, in a 
particular case is a probl6Tl which pro-
perly requires a detennination by the 
trial court based on a balancing of sev-
eral factcrs, i.e., pctential hazards to 
the safety of the parties involved, public 
interest in protecting the flow of infor-
mation from informants, and defendant's 
right tc prepare his defense; based on 
such factors, the trial court must deter-
mine how the interests of Justice will 
best be served. (citations omitted) 
Appellants by filing with the District Court a Notice of Alibi 
and entering a plea of not guilty and Appellant Jacobsen's testirrony at 
trial as well as the informant's participation in the sale of the VCR 
as set forth in the Affidavit in Suppcrt of the Search Warrant substantiate 
Appellants' contention that the informant in this case was rrore then a mere 
informer but that he actually took an active part in arranging and meeting 
and witnessed the illegal sale. The aspect of the Forshee case which 
V1 tiate any prejudice flowing to the Defendants in this case was as stated 
by the Supreme Court at 611 P.2d 122°.: 
Ho1~ever, it is defendant's very knovJledge 
of the informer's identity that further 
served to vitiate any pre Judice wluch may 
have other,1ise res\lltc_-0 fn:rn U1P lovlPr 
court's failure to requirP disclosure. 
In this case thE" record l'.: bu.r'f' n L]drd1nq ApfH_ 1 Jarit c,' k!Fl'.'.'].-·rJ,11 
of the ident1 ty of u-,e confldPnti.il inform,11t. 
rrnv1dcs: 
POHIT III 
TI-!E COURl ERRED BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
TI!M AN UNSATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF 
POSSESSION COLlf'LlIJ WITI-! OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES 
MAY BE SUFFICIENT TO CONNECT THE POSSESSORS 
WITI-! TI-!E OFFENSE OF THEFT AND BURGLARY AND 
JUSTIFY TI-!EIR CONVICTION OF THESE OFFENSES. 
Utah Law as contained 76-6-402 Utah Annotated, 1953, as amended 
TI1e follovnng presurrption shall be appli-
cable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, 
when no satisfactory explanation of such pos-
session is made, shall be deemed prima facie 
evidence that the person in possession stole 
the property. 
r~11 •'l l Lll1t s contend that this provision of Utah law is unconstitutional on 
1'=s face since it penalizes a person for exercising his constitutional 
rFJh1 tc, remain silent. 
The Court instruction at Instruction No. 18 as follows: 
A person cormuts theft if he obtains or exer-
cises unauthorized control over the property 
of another with the purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
Possession of property recently stolen, when 
no satisfactory explanation of such possession 
is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence 
that the person in possession stole the pro-
perty. 
!'l'l" I !ant Chamh.'rs did not testify at the trial and under Utah and Federal 
'1t•it1on,1l la"'' it viould be improper to comnent on Appellant Charrbers 
l•n•' t•, t.ox,t 1fy. Tiw c1h<•Vt' Instruct1on does exactly that. By telling 
: l J, 't F ·( r I 1(it t I it_' i:=x-~rson in possession of that pro-
I· 'I"· l''"["·t t·;. The· Ut,,[1 Supreme Court in State v. \'lisviell, 
629 P.2d 146 (1981) in relying upon Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) 
held that reference to post arrest silence is prejudicial. 
The Court's Instruction No. 18 is a direct reference to Ap-
pell ant Charrbers post arrest silence. 
appears: 
POIN1 IV 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION THAT POSSESSIOrJ 
OF PROPERTY RECENTLY STOLEN, WHEN NO SATIS-
FACTORY EXPLANATION OF SUCH POSSESSION IS 
MADE, SHALL BE DEEl''1ED PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE 
THAT THE PERSOn rn POSSESSION STOLE THE PRO-
PERTY IMPROPERLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
TO THE IDEID''NTS AIID WAS INCQnSISTENT WITH 
DEFENDANTS' RIGH'S TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT. 
In Instruction No. 18 of the Court's instructions the fol lovnng 
A person comnits theft if he obtains or exer-
cises unauthorized control over the property 
of another with the purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
Possession of property recently stolen, when 
no satisfactory explanation of such possession 
is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence 
that the person in possession stole the pro-
perty. 
The Utah Suprme Court in State v. Walton, 646 P.2d 689 (1982) ruled that 
it was error to instruct the Jury that the la\'l presumes a person intends 
the reasonable and orchnary consequences of his ovm acts. In ruling on 
that case the Court relied upon Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. ':>10, CJ9 S.Ct. 
2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), in holding that it was a violation of defen-
dant's due process rights to give the above r·eferred to Instr-uct1on. 
Sandstrom, supra and quoted extCTLSl'Jt'ly frnn1 s.in1btr-uc dS f,;])1•.:c 
First, a r·easonable JUry rnu11l V!f'~ l l1ri'/f' 
int Prpreted the pr e9r.1pr-1 on d::- "r ·, 111, l u-
s1 ve," that is, ncJt tf-><·~un 1 ·dll'/ dL, ,1 r 1r• 
-tl-
surrption at all, but rather as in ir-
rebuttable direction by the court to 
find intent once convinced of the facts 
triggering the prest.nption. Alternatively, 
the Jury may have interpreted the instruc-
tion as a direction to find intent upon 
proof of the defendant's voluntary actions 
(and the1 r "ordinary" consequences) , unless 
the defendant proved the contrary by sare 
quantum of proof which may well have been 
considerably greater than "sare" evidence-
thus effectively shifting the burden of 
persuasion on the element of intent. 
The Utah Supreme Court then went on to apply the Sandstran 
ruling to the Walton facts by holding: 
It is true that in the instant case, the jury 
was told that it may employ the prest.rnption. 
It was not canpelled to do so. That fact, 
however, does not elirrunate the error. Since 
it was given the option of employing the pre-
sumption, we have no way of being assured that 
the defendant was not convicted on the basis 
of that presumption. The presumption was not 
permissive in the sense that the jury was told 
that it could be considered along with other 
evidence in resolving the issue of intent. 
Rather, the jury was told that it could employ 
the presumption. If it did, it may have fallen 
victim to the mischief pointed out in Sandstrom 
v. Montana, supra. 
In the present case the Court's Instruction that possession of 
i=''"f'erty recently stolen when no satisfactory explanation of such possession 
is rr~ide shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession 
st.Jlf' the property created in the case at bar a presumption regarding an 
oe]e'f:n1t of the Stiite's case. This presumption flies in the face of Ap-
1 • 11 ants' "presurnpt ion of innocence" anrl irrproperly shifts the burden of 
r ·u1;n v 
nn:m ,,;,s rn:oUFFICIErH EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY 
CC 1: JV! ,~Tl()[ I [[J THTS CASE. 
At'f>ell.u,+c; cunt,onri tlii1t because there was no direct evidence 
offense, coupled with the unrebutted alibi eVldence preseritc°<CI at trtdl, 
that there was insuff1c1ent evidence upon which a Jury could cnnv1d. 
Appellants concede that this argument is ITDre forceful as it rPliltes to 
Appellants' conviction for burglary than Appellants' conV1ct1on for theft 
but even as l t relates to theft tllere was insuff1c1ent eVldence to JUSt1fy 
conV1ct1on for the cri!T'€ charged. 
CONCLUS.DN 
For the foregoing reasons Appellants seek reversal of their 
conV1ct1ons, or in the al ternat1 ve for a nevJ trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this r ay of/-~'-"--'---~-/-' 1 CJ84. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregornq 
Brief was mailed David L. Vlilkinson, Attorney General , 23(, St ate Cap1 tol, 
Salt Lake C1 ty, Utall 84114, on lh1s -2.!!' da 
- ~I \ 
